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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
damages or penalties in lease contracts. For the most part great stress is
placed upon each particular fact situation and the opposing equities involved,
with the result that the rules of interpretation are frequently utilized or
disregarded depending upon the desired result. The modern tendency
appears to place less emphasis on the intent of the parties, in terms of the
possibility that the contract might have proven to work an inequitable
result, and now views liquidated damages provisions with candor, enforcing
such provisions within the bounds of reasonableness.
There seems to be no logical reason why courts should not favor or
even encourage parties to adjust their damages in advance. This will enable
the parties to contract with the knowledge of the result of a breach and
will add some stability to lease contracts which are, in their very nature,
unstable. This is especially significant in a tourist area such as Florida.
Even more important is the tendency away from litigation which
such a view will encourage. Not only will this alleviate in some way, the
crowded condition of the courts, but will avoid the harmful effect of
litigation on business. Litigation is expensive in terms of money and in
terms of time can prove to be disastrous.
JUtIUs SER
AIR CARRIERS-TARIFF LIMITATIONS AS A BAR TO
PERSONAL INJURY SUITS
INTRODUCTION
Air carriers, like other interstate common carriers, are required to
publish tariffs setting forth their rates, fares, charges, and other information
pertaining thereto.
Notice of claim and time for suit limitations had, in the past, been
included by the air carriers in their filed tariffs,1 for the alleged purpose of
deterring fraudulent claims; the theory being that prompt notice enables
the carrier to facilitate timely investigation. The result was that many
uninformed passengers, who were not apprised of these conditions, except
for a stipulation in the ticket: "sold subject to tariff regulations", were
precluded from bringing suit for their injuries.
Realizing that these rules tend to become traps for the unwary, since
the traveling public and their lawyers do not think of aviation in terms
of special rules of procedure, the Civil Aeronautics Board saw fit to amend
its Economic Regulations to the effect that tariff rules limiting or
1, A typical provision of this nature would read as follows:
No action shall be maintained for any injury to or the death of any passenger
unless notice of the claim is presented in writing to the general office of the
participating carrier alleged to be responsible within ninety days after the
alleged occurrence of the events giving rise to the claim and unless the action
is commenced within one year after the alleged occurrence.
COMMENTS
conditioning the carriers' liability for personal injury or death will not
be accepted.
2
At first glance it would appear that this is the solution to the problem;
an end to much hard-fought litigation that has arisen over this matter.
Such, however, is not the case, for the intent of the Board in passing this
Amendment was not to make any ruling on the legality of such limitations.3
Rather, the CAB clearly contends that it has statutory authority to accept
time limitations by specific requirement.
It is the purpose of this comment to examine many of the cases on
this subject, to point up the inconsistencies and weak reasoning in the
cases, and to give the author's own views on the problem of whether or
not the Civil Aeronautics Board has statutory authority to accept time
limitations as a part of the air carriers' tariff.
TARIFF PROVISIONS OF THE AcT
Under Section 403(a) of the Civil Aeronautics Act 4 every air carrier:
.. . shall file with the Board, and print, and keep open to public
inspection, tariffs showing all rates, fares, and charges for air
transportation . . . and showing to the extent required by regula-
tions of the Board, all classifications, rules, regulations, practices,
and services in connection with such air transportation.
The Section continues:
Tariffs shall be filed, posted, and published in such form and
manner, and shall contain such information, as the Board shall
by regulation prescribe;5 and the Board is empowered to reject
any tariff so filed which is not consistent with this section and such
regulations.
In an attempt to prevent discrimination and assure uniform treatment
to all persons dealing with air carriers, Section 403(b)6 requires such
carriers to abide by their filed tariffs; departure from same being made
a criminal offense.7
2. Civil Aeronautics Board Economic Regulation No. ER-195, 19 FEn. REC.
509 (1954).
3. The Board is presently conducting an investigation to determine the legality
of such clauses. investigation of Tariff Liability Rules, 1953 U.S. Av. R. 198 (C.A.B.
Docket No. 6149, 1953).
4. 52 STAT. 992 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 483(a) (1952).
5. The regulation issued by the Board which specifically pertains to the contents
of tariffs filed by air carriers is 14 C.F.R. § 221.4 (Rev. ed. 1952), part (g) of which
provides that tariffs shall contain "general rules which govern the tariff, i.e., state
conditions which in any way affect the rates named in the tariff, or the service under
such rates." By virtue of the aforementioned amendment, see note 2 supra, added
to the original portion of the statute is the following:
No provision of the Board's Regulations issued under this Part or elsewhere
shall be construed to require on and after March 2, 1954, the filing of any
tariff rules stating any limitation on, or condition relating to, the carrier's
liability for personal injury or death.
6. 52 STAT. 992 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 483(b) (1952).
7. 52 STA-r. 1015 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 662(d) (1952).
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It is well established, under statutes providing for the filing of tariff
schedules and prohibiting any deviation therefrom, that passengers will
be charged with notice of those provisions of the tariff which are filed
pursuant to statutory authority, regardless of actual noticeY Conversely,
persons are not chargeable with notice of rates or regulations filed with
the commission which are not required to be filed.10 Hence, the principal
question is one of statutory interpretation-whether or not the federal
statute or the Civil Aeronautics Board regulations permit the registration
of tariffs containing exculpatory provisions.
COURTS' INTERPRETATION
One of the earliest cases considering the validity of time limitations
in a tariff filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board appears to have been
Wilhelmy v. Northwest Airlines," decided in 1949 by the Federal District
Court for the Western District of Washington. That was an action
against the defendant air carrier for alleged negligent injury to plaintiff's
car and throat. Defendant interposed the affirmative defense that the
plaintiff-passenger failed to give seasonable notice of claim as required
by the air carrier's filed tariff-reference being made thereto by a stipulation
in the ticket, "sold subject to tariff regulations." The court held that the
legend appearing in the ticket served as sufficient notification of the thirty-
day notice of claim requirement and the one-year limit for commencing
suit provision, both of which are "reasonable and valid."'
2
The rationale of the court is not clearly discernible from the reported
decision. The holding appears to be grounded on the case of Jones v.
Northwest Airlines.'3 In this case, a flight was cancelled because of
inclement weather and plaintiff sued for damages resulting from this
alleged breach of contract. In defense, the air carrier pleaded its filed
tariff regulations to the effect that the airline will not be responsible for
failure of aircraft to depart or arrive on schedule. In holding against the
8. Cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 256 U.S. 566 (1921);
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94 (1915); Boston & Maine R.R. v.
Hooker, 233 U.S. 97 (1913); Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Mugg & Dryden, 202 U.S.
242 (1906).
9. Where reasonable time limitations have been included in the contract of
carriage they have been upheld by the courts on a contractual basis-not under the
theory of constructive notice. Gooch v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 258 U.S. 22 (1925)
(agreement in "drover's pass" requiring notice to railroad within 30 days held valid);
The Finland, 35 F.2d 47 (E.D.N.Y. 1929) (provision in steamship ticket requiring
notice within 30 days held valid); Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Pan American Airways,
58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (stipulation in transportation contract between airways
company and passenger requiring 30 days notice of claim held valid); Sheldon v. Pan
American Airways, 190 Misc. 537, 74 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (clause in contract
of transportation between airways company and passenger requiring written notice of
claim within 30 days held valid).
10. Pacific S.S. Co. v. Cackette, 8 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1925), cert. denied 269 U.S.
586 (1926); Southern Pacific Co. v. U.S., 272 U.S. 445 (1926).
11, 86 F. Supp. 565 (W.D. Wash. 1949).
12. Id. at 568.
13. 157 P.2d 728 (Wash. 1945).
COMMENTS
plaintiff, the court said, "His ticket was sold subject to tariff regulations
with which he was charged with notice."
14
The cancellation of flights pertains directly to the operation of airlines.15
Hence, statutory authority exists for the filing of such matters with the
Board, and the passenger will be charged with notice thereof.15 Nowhere,
however, is it shown that statutory authority exists for the filing of time
limitations, therefor it is submitted that the Jones case is inapplicable from
a factual standpoint.
In arriving at its decision, the Wilhelmy court also reasons that the
terms of the filed tariff are incorporated by reference into the transportation
contract by virtue of the legend in the ticket.17 In so ruling, the court
distinguishes the case of Pacific Steamship Co. v. Cackette,8 which really
held that:
Notice of claims for . . .damages has no perceptible relation to
rates and charges for transportation. When a company desires to
impose special and most stringent terms upon its customers, in
exoneration of its own liability, there is nothing unreasonable in
requiring that those terms shall be distinctly declared and de-
liberately accepted.19
Shortly after the momentous Wilhelmy decision, two district court
cases were decided on similar facts. In Meredith v. United Air Lines,29
a passenger instituted a personal injury suit for damages resulting from
the carriers failure to keep the plane adequately pressurized. Defendant's
motion for summary judgment was granted. The court-citing the Wil-
helmy and Jones cases as authority-held that notification by plaintiff's
physician, although made within 90 days, was not sufficient compliance
with the filed tariff, since written notice of the injury was not sent to the
carrier's general offices. Suffice to say, it is difficult for the writer to be
impressed by the legal reasoning, or lack of same, employed by this court.
Likewise, in Herman v. Capital Airlines,2  the court summarily held
the action barred where it was not brought within the one year limitation
contained in the carrier's tariff-irrespective of the fact that plaintiff did
not know the full extent of her injuries until shortly before she filed suit.
The Wilhelm, case is not mentioned in the reported decision, but it
perhaps was controlling.
14. Id. at 729.
15. See Crowell v. Eastern Air Lines, 240 N.C. 20, 28, 81 S.E.2d 178, 185 (1954).
16. See note 8 supra.
17. The court cites Koontz v. South Suburban Safeway Lines, 332 Ill. App. 14,
73 N.E.2d 919 (1947) as authority for this proposition. The Koontz case, though,
pertained to the incorporation by reference of rate schedules into the transportation
contract; not notice of claim provisions.
18. 8 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1925), cert denied, 269 U.S. 586 (1926) (filed notice
of claim and time for suit limitations, reference being made thereto by stipulation in
ticket, held not valid).
19. Id. at 261.
20. 1951 U.S. Av. R. 103 (D. Cal. 1950).
21. 104 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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It is encouraging to find that since 1952 the courts have been reluctant
to follow the Wilhelmy decision. Instead, they have rejected notice of
claim and time for suit limitations in reliance upon the Cackette case. In
Shortley v. Northwestern Airlines,22 foremost'- under this new trend of
cases, the court said;
Nowhere . , . in the Act of Congress [Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938), or in the regulations promulgated by the Board, is there
any authorization or requirement for the inclusion in a tariff of
any provision respecting limitation upon notice of claims or upon
the time for commencement of actions thereon ....
Where a tariff provision is gratuitously inserted with respect to
a matter other than that contemplated or required by the Act of
Congress, or the regulations made pursuant thereto, a passenger
or shipper is not chargeable with notice as a matter of law with
respect thereto. A tariff is ordinarily understood to be a system
of rates and charges. Pacific SS. Co. v. Cackette .... 24
In the case of Thomas v. American Airlines,26 similarly relying on the
Cackette case, the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas held
that "[tihe limitation period[s] for giving notice and bringing suit in
the tariffs of a common carrier are binding upon the passengers only if
there is statutory authority for filing such tariff .... "12
And in the District Court for the Western District of Missouri, 27
the court said: "While in the case of Wilhelmy v. Northwest Airlines
... [the Court] held that the claim was barred by the provisions of the
regulation yet this decision has not been followed, but a contrary ruling
was made in the case of Shortley v, Northwestern Airlines ....
Two cases29 have since been decided; each apparently followed the
Shortley decision in holding time limitations invalid for lack of statutory
authority.
22. 104 F. Supp. 152 (D.C. 1952).
23. Glenn v. Compania Cubana De Aviacon, 102 F. Supp 631 (S.D. Fla. 1952)
was decided two months prior to the Shortley case. The court, however, failed to set
forth clearly its reasons for invalidating the 30 day notice of claim provision and the
one year time for suit limitation which was filed in the air carrier's tariff.
24. 104 F. Supp. 152, 155.
25. 104 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Ark. 1952).
26. Ibid.
27. Toman v. Mid-Continent Air Lines, 107 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Mo. 1952).
28. Id. at 346.
29. Bernard v. U. S. Aircoach, 117 F. Supp. 134 (SD. Cal. 1953). Carrier
pleaded its filed tariff containing time limitations as a defense to passenger's personal
injury suit. The court held that the carrier had waived this "supposed defense" by
failing to plead it seasonably. In well-stated dicta the court said on p. 142 that even
if this were not so, the defense would not be allowable because "Lil t is clear that there
is no statutory mandate or permission for the particular 'snare' or 'trap' contended by
the defendant .... "; Crowell v. Eastern Air Lines, 240 NC. 20, 81 S.E.2d 178 (1954).
The court said on p. 184: "It would seem that the Civil Aeronautics Act does not
require or authorize in the filed tariff the time limitation as to filing notice of claim
and commencement of suit pleaded as a defense by Air Lines in this action and that
such a provision is ineffective."
COMMENTS
BOARD'S INTERPRETATION
In a recent suit brought in a federal district court 0 for injuries
resulting from the crash of defendant's plane, the action was stayed so
that plaintiffs might obtain a CAB ruling on the validity of the notice
requirements in the air carrier's filed tariffs. In proceedings before the
Board, it was held that a thirty day notice of claim provision is unreasonable
and unlawful.
31
Although the Civil Aeronautics Board side-stepped the question of
whether or not statutory authority exists for the filing of such time
limitations, 32 it is interesting to notice the reasoning employed in arriving
at the decision. The Board found that because of the close carrier-
passenger relationship, demonstrated by the registry and attendance
practices, "the rule in question is not reasonably necessary for [the carrier's]
protection,"33 especially since it has been used to "defeat the normal
liability of a common carrier," 3 4 and to enable discriminatory practices.
But in amending its Economic Regulations 5 so as to exclude time
provisions, the Board adopts a contra stand. It specifically claims statutory
authority for the inclusion of time provisions within an airline tariff. As
stated on p. 510:
The Board is of the opinion that the rules herein dealt with
are clearly carrier rules, regulations and practices in connection with
air transportation and, as such could be required by the Board to
be filed under section 403(a) [of the Civil Aeronautics Act].
Consequently, the Board by specific requirement could give effect
to rules of this character, provided they were reasonable and
nondiscriminatory.
The above contention is unreasonable. It is unfounded in law, as
evidenced by the recent trend in the cases; if permitted to stand, a carrier
might virtually insert any provision in its tariff, merely by effectuating a
filing with the Board.
Perusal of the Act and regulations pertaining thereto fails to disclose
statutory authority for the placing of time limitations in a filed tariff.
Part 221.4 of the Economic Regulations 36 states that tariffs shall contain
general rules which affect the rates named in the tariff, or the service under
such ratesY71 Hardly does it seem plausible that the rates of air carriers
30. Battista v. Continental Charters, Inc., 1952 U.S. Av. R. 471 (S.D. Fla. 1952).
31. Continental Charters, Inc., Complaint of Battista, 3 PiKE & FismnR An. L.Aw
(2d ser.) (Decisions) 130 (CAB 1953).
32. This issue is presently before the Board, Investigation of Tariff Liability
Rules, 1953 U.S. Av. R 198 (C.A.B. Docket No. 6149, 1953).
33. Continental Charters. Inc. Complaint of Battista, 3 PisE & FisrER An. LAw
(2d ser.) (Decisions) 130, 132 (C.A.B. 1953).
34. Ibid.
35. CAB Economic Regulations No. ER-195, 19 FED REc. 509 (1954).
36. 14 C.F.R. § 221.4 (g)(Rev. ed. 1952).
37. Ibid.
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are affected by a rule which requires notice of claim and commencement
of suit limitations. Consequently, the only possible vindication for this
rule is that it affects the service under such rates.
"Service" is variously defined as "any work done for the benefit of
another; the act of helping another or of promoting his interests in any
way."38' And a glance at the Act indicates that this term is used in its
ordinary connotation. 39 Therefore, it would seem that "service", as used
in Part 221.4, implies the performance by the carrier of some affirmative
duty towards the passenger. But the rule under examination exacts nothing
of the carrier; instead it imposes the burden of performance upon the
passenger.40  Hence, this rule affects neither the rates nor the service
of a carrier-and it is not includible in the carrier's tariff.
It is also pertinent to note that the Interstate Commerce Act, which,
in many respects served as a model for the Civil Aeronautics Act, made
specific provision for notice of claim and time for suit limitations."
Likewise, the Shipping Act 42 and Motor Carrier Act 43 expressly provide
for the use of time provisions. It is submitted that, in the act under
consideration, Congress has deliberately excluded such provisions. A
fortiori, the Board or the carrier is powerless to act on this matter-state
law on the subject governing.
CONCLUSION
Air carriers are entitled to the protection offered by notice of claim
and time for suit limitations. The likelihood of fraudulent claims is
proportionate with the passage of time; as evidence pertaining to the
accident becomes obscure, injuries tend to become more lucid. Concededly,
the unprotected carrier should not be placed at the mercy of those
passengers who might be fraudulently disposed.
But as indicated earlier, the evolved method of providing for these
limitations-by reference to the filed tariffs-is equally unjust. The bona
fide passenger, who very rarely knows the contents of a carrier's tariff4 '
38. FuNK & WAONALL'S NEw STANDARD DICTIONARY (1954).
39. 52 STAT. 992 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 483 (b) (1952). No air carrier shall charge a
different rate "for air transportation, or for any service in connection therewith," than
the rates specified in the filed tariffs. (emphasis supplied),
40. See McKay, Airline Tariff Provisions as a Bar to Actions for Personal Injuries,
18 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 160, 163-166 (1950).
41. 46 STAT. 252 (1930), 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1952). The Interstate Commerce
Act requires written notice of claim within nine months and commencement of suit
within two years for any loss or damage to property.
42. 49 STAT. 960 (1935), 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1952). The Shipping Act
prohibits notice of claim limitations of less than six months and commencement of suit
limitations of less than one year for death and injury claims.
43. 49 STAT. 563 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 319 (1952), now Part I1 of the ICA.
It provides that § 20(11) of the ICA shall apply. See note 41 supra.
44. Civil Aeronautics Board Economic Regulation No. ER-195. 19 FEn. Re.
509 (1954).
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is subject to having his action dismissed for failure to comply with these
surreptitious conditions.
The CAB, in attempting to rectify this situation, amended its regula-
tions 45 so as to exclude time limitations from the filed tariff. However, a
reversal of this present position is possible, since the Board contends
statutory authority for requiring such limitations. Hence, the present state
of affairs is highly uncertain.
Therefore, it is this writer's opinion that the situation beckons for
affirmative Congressional legislation. A uniform rule requiring reasonable
notice of claim and time for suit limitations would alleviate further
hardships by placing appropriate, much-needed limitations clearly before
the public's eye.
HERBERT E. SAKs
45. Ibid.
